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The 2011 eruption of Shinmoedake, Japan, deposited tephra across Miyazaki prefecture impacting both urban
and rural environments. We provide an overview of the impacts, management and recovery of a modern
city, infrastructure networks and a diverse agricultural region following this moderate sized explosive eruption,
focusing on four key sectors. Cleanup of tephra was time consuming, physically demanding and costly for
residents, businesses and municipal authorities. The agricultural sector sustained large initial impacts with
smothering, loading and abrasion of crops, soils and greenhouses. However, extreme concerns at the time of
the eruption were not realised, with farming operations experiencing limited long-term effects. There were few
disruptions to electrical networks due to resilient insulator design, a successful cleaning program, relatively
coarse tephra and dry conditions. Cancellations and delays occurred on three rail lines resulting primarily
from mechanical failure of track switches and loss of electrical contact between train wheels and tracks. Both
residents and organisations exhibited high levels of adaptive capacity in response to the event and utilised
regional and national networks to obtain information on past events and recovery strategies. The combination
of relatively short eruption duration, well resourced and coordinated organisations and resilient infrastructure
networks contributed to a strong recovery.
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1. Introduction
Effective volcanic risk management requires having a
robust knowledge of the likely impacts of individual haz-
ards. Impact assessment approaches in volcanology (e.g.
Blong and McKee, 1995; Wilson et al., 2007, 2012a;
Jenkins et al., 2013) mirror those in other hazard disci-
plines (e.g. earthquake, tsunami, etc.), which rely on rel-
atively short (several days to weeks) post-event on-site as-
sessments, which aim to observe impacts and/or document
the effectiveness of mitigation measures and crisis man-
agement strategies; see FEMA (2006), Boughton et al.
(2011), Cubrinovski et al. (2011), EERI (2011), Spence
et al. (2011), Architectural Institute of Japan (2012) and
Bird et al. (2013), as examples. This has been an effective
way to begin building a body of evidence detailing volcanic
impacts on human activities across different eruption mag-
nitudes, durations and styles in varying climates and eco-
systems. Each new eruption represents an opportunity to
add to the global knowledge base through analysing erup-
tion characteristics and corresponding effects to the local
environment and human activities.
The 2011 eruption of Shinmoedake volcano, Kyushu Is-
land, offered an opportunity to observe the impacts, man-
agement and short-term recovery of a moderate-sized tephra
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fall event on both a modern city and a diverse, densely pop-
ulated agricultural region in southern Japan. Beginning on
19 January 2011, the eruption produced an eruption plume
that deposited tephra predominantly to the southeast affect-
ing ten municipalities, including Miyakonojo City, Taka-
haru Town, Mimata Town and Nichinan City (Fig. 1). The
agricultural areas of Miike (∼7 km from vent) and Yamada
(∼17 km from vent), both within Miyakonojo City, were
signiﬁcantly affected by heavy tephra falls.
Previous studies highlight that agriculture, the built en-
vironment, critical infrastructure networks, transport net-
works and human health are commonly affected during
a tephra fall event and often require the most manage-
ment support (Blong, 1984; Johnston et al., 2000; Hor-
well and Baxter, 2006; Wilson et al., 2011, 2012a; Bird
and Gı´slado´ttir, 2012). Impacts are typically interdepen-
dent across a range of sectors, requiring a holistic and inte-
grated management response (Johnston et al., 2000; Wilson
et al., 2012b). Assessing vulnerability to tephra fall is more
complex than simply relating thickness or mass loading to
the degree of impact; the duration and timing of an event,
along with other attributes such as grain size, mineralogy
and soluble acidic salt content, are all important controls
(e.g. Cook et al., 1981; Folsom, 1986; Cronin et al., 1998,
2003; Witham et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2011, 2012b). Of
equal importance is the resilience of the community, organi-
sation or unit, in relation to economic, environmental, social
and political variables (Reycraft and Bawden, 2000; Haynes
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Fig. 1. Area impacted by tephra falls from the 2011 Shinmoedake eruption. Isomass contours are in kg/m2 and describe tephra accumulation prior
to 28th January (AIST, 2011). Municipality boundaries are in white. Letters in boxes refer to place names mentioned in the text: KC Kagoshima
City Hall (central Kagoshima), Ki Kirishima, Ma Makizono, MA Miyazaki Airport, MC Miyakonojo City Hall (central Miyakonojo), Mi Miike,
MT Mimata Town Hall (central Mimata), NC Nichinan City Hall (central Nichinan), Ta Takazaki, Ya Yamada and Yo Yoshinomoto. White triangle
Shinmoedake volcano and black triangle Sakurajima volcano.
et al., 2008; Bird and Gı´slado´ttir, 2012). The interaction of
all these factors collectively determines the socio-economic
loss and disruption (Ort et al., 2008).
Our aims in this study were to assess the impacts of
tephra fall to exposed communities during the 2011 Shin-
moedake eruption and to discuss with those directly in-
volved the management of these impacts. We focused on
understanding tephra fall impacts to individual system com-
ponents but also considered overall system functionality.
These aims were designed to capture lessons from the expe-
rience that might inform the future management of tephra
falls in the region and in other municipalities exposed to
similar hazards. The manuscript presents an overview of
the eruption focusing on tephra producing phases, analyses
areas exposed to tephra fall, and documents impacts and
management strategies. We focus on four key sectors iden-
tiﬁed as signiﬁcant during this particular eruption: tephra
cleanup operations, agriculture, electric power systems and
the rail network.
2. 2011 Shinmoedake Eruption
Shinmoedake volcano stands on the boundary of
Kagoshima and Miyazaki Prefectures and is the most re-
cently active eruptive centre in the Kirishima volcanic com-
plex (Imura and Kobayashi, 1991; Imura, 1992). The com-
plex includes more than twenty small Quaternary centres
that form a composite volcano covering an area of approx-
imately 20 × 30 km2 (Imura, 1992; Imura and Kobayashi,
2001). Prior to 2011, the most recent signiﬁcant eruption
(bulk volume 0.21 km3) from the Kirishima complex oc-
curred between 1716 and 1717; magmatic eruptions with
volumes less than 0.01 km3 then occurred in 1771–1772
and 1822 (Imura and Kobayashi, 1991; Imura, 1992). Small
phreatic eruptions occurred in 1959, 1991 and 2008 (Imura
and Kobayashi, 2001; Miyabuchi et al., 2013).
After a period of inﬂation, the 2011 eruption began with
a phreatomagmatic explosion on 19 January, which was
then followed by a small tephra explosion on 22 January.
Most tephra was deposited as the result of Subplinian ex-
plosions on 26 and 27 January, generating plumes up to
8.5 km that travelled southeast of the vent. Tephra was
erupted continuously until 30 January and regular plumes
were observed into March. The last tephra plume was ob-
served on 7 September 2011 (Siebert and Simkin, 2002–,
with information collated from the Earthquake Research
Institute, University of Tokyo (ERI); Geographical Survey
of Japan (GSI); Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA); and
Tokyo Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC); Hasenaka et
al., 2011; Miyabuchi et al., 2013).
In this manuscript we will focus on the impacts observed
as the result of tephra accumulation during the main fall-
out phase of the eruption; additional consequences are sum-
marised in Table 1. A 2 km exclusion zone was put in place
at the onset of the eruption, which was increased to 3 km on
31 January 2011. Considerable impacts to business revenue
were reported within and near to the exclusion zone, where
there is a thriving tourist hot springs industry. Tourist num-
bers remained low 9 months after the eruption, with many
perceiving the area to be unsafe. Several thousand people
in Miyakonojo and Takaharu evacuated for short periods of
days to weeks, mostly from areas exposed to potential la-
hars.
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Table 1. Summary of non-tephra fall impacts during the Shinmoedake eruption.
Hazard Details
Clast fallout 27 January: Large clasts (4–6 cm diameter) cracked car windows in Miike, 7 km from the vent.
14 February: 1.5–2 cm diameter scoria clasts caused damage in Kobayashi City (14 km from vent),
including breakage of solar panels and car windows and holes in plastic corrugated rooﬁng.
As at 7 March there were 696 reported cases of damage in Kobayashi City.
27 January–18 April: 32 recorded cases of solar panel and car window damage in Takaharu Town.
Shockwaves 1 February: An estimated 381 panes of glass were broken in 99 schools, hotels and houses
in the Makizono and Kirishima areas of Kirishima City. Some of these windows were wire-reinforced
and damage was not restricted to windows facing the volcano. Damage occurred up to 12 km
from the vent. Window and doorframes were also bent.
2 February: Shockwaves from two explosive eruptions broke windows in Yoshinomoto, Miyakonojo City,
and in Kirishima (one person injured, see Table 7).
A total of 215 buildings in Kirishima City reported cases of glass breakage (as at 7 March). There were
also isolated reports of bending of automatic door tracks and damage to light ﬁttings.
Lahars 17 February: A storm event prompted evacuation advisories for 2,523 residents (1,148 households)
in Miyakonojo City and 214 residents (99 households) in Takaharu Town.
Catchments in Takaharu Town ﬁlled with pyroclastic debris, leading authorities to undertake
24 catchment clearing operations between mid-February and September.
Sources: Cabinet Ofﬁce (2011); Fukuoka District Meteorological Observatory Volcano Monitoring and Information Centre and
Kagoshima Regional Meteorological Observatory (2011); Kagoshima Regional Meteorological Observatory (2011); Takaharu Town
(2011a); Miyazaki Nichinichi Shimbun, 2 February 2011; Asahi Shimbun and Minaminippon Shimbun, 2 February 2011; Siebert and
Simkin (2002–).
We have not considered impacts to the aviation sector in
depth within this manuscript. However, Tokyo VAAC is-
sued 140 advisories between January andMarch 2011 based
on regular tephra plumes observed by pilots and satellite
imagery. This reduced to 14 advisories between April and
July. Miyazaki Airport was closed at various times through-
out the eruptive activity, causing the cancelation and rerout-
ing of ﬂights. This contributed to 22% fewer passengers
than the previous year, on domestic ﬂights entering or ex-
iting this airport between 26 January and 10 March (prior
to the Tohoku Earthquake) (Miyazaki Airport Building Co.
Ltd., 2011).
3. Study Area
Miyakonojo City is the second largest city in Miyazaki
Prefecture with an area of 653 km2 and approximately 170
thousand residents (City of Miyakonojo, 2013). The city
centre, positioned approximately 27 km SE of the vent, re-
ceived an estimated 1 kg/m2 of tephra (Fig. 1). Takaharu
Town centre (12 km E of the vent) was spared large accum-
mulations of tephra with only 0–0.5 kg/m2 reported in in-
habited areas. Mimata Town centre (30 km SE of the vent)
and Nicihinan City centre (58 km SE of the vent) received
an estimated 3–5 kg/m2 and 1–2 kg/m2 respectively.
Miyazaki Prefecture is one of the largest livestock pro-
ducers in Japan, with total agriculture production in 2008
estimated at 324,600 million JPY (∼4.2 billion USD as at
January 2011). Of this value, 41% was attributed to ‘culti-
vated production’, 48% to ‘livestock production’ and 1% to
‘processed agriculture’ (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries, 2010). Farm size generally increases with
elevation above sea level and, as topography steepens in-
land, production switches to a higher proportion of live-
stock feedlot farming, predominantly pigs, poultry and beef
cows. Farms are typically small (<10 ha) and achieve high
intensity production. Lowland areas are dominated by crop
production, especially rice and tea; ground and root vegeta-
bles as well as tree crops. The use of greenhouses for fur-
ther intensiﬁcation of production is widespread. Double and
even triple cropping occurs in some areas throughout the
year with relatively warm, moist (rainfall: 2,580 mm/year),
sub-tropical (latitude 31◦N) conditions (JMA, 2012). Many
households have small landholdings to supplement income,
with only 25% of 50,735 farmers stating their main busi-
ness as agriculture (2005 census data; Miyazaki Prefecture,
2010). More than half the agricultural workforce is older
than 60 years (51.5% in Miyazaki prefecture) (Miyazaki
Prefecture, 2010).
4. Methodology
In this study, the authors made two visits to the tephra-
affected area. The ﬁrst, between 28 January and 3 Febru-
ary 2011, corresponded with the end of the major tephra
deposition phase and when residents, businesses and local
governments were assessing impacts and beginning cleanup
(Magill and Okada, 2011). At this time, there was still a
great deal of uncertainty and concern over potential contin-
uation of volcanic activity. The second visit was in mid-
November 2011, nine months after the peak of the erup-
tion crisis, and provided the opportunity to observe fully
manifested impacts, examine the short-term recovery and
discuss the effectiveness of management decisions with rel-
evant stakeholders. The two ﬁeld visits were beneﬁcial in
understanding emerging impacts, identifying relative stress
points and in building relationships with affected stakehold-
ers.
Research methods for the ﬁrst ﬁeld investigation included
tephra collection and semi-structured interviews with res-
idents, business owners, farmers and agricultural organi-
sations. Semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, in-
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cluding critical infrastructure, agriculture and emergency
management organisations, took place during the second
visit. At this time, participants could give a more reﬂec-
tive view of issues while not having to deal with the im-
mediate crisis. Interview questions were adapted to be rel-
evant for each participant, but typically followed: impacts
experienced; cleanup requirements; immediate mitigation
strategies and their effectiveness; the effectiveness of emer-
gency management plans and any subsequent adaptations
since the eruption; interdependency with other systems, or-
ganisations or sectors; and the recovery process. The inter-
view format allowed free exploration and discussion around
the various topics that had been touched upon in question
responses. All participants we spoke to were eager to pass
on their experiences. Interviews were conducted by three
researchers, one being ﬂuent in both Japanese and English
who also acted as translator, and responses recorded by no-
tation. Interviews were reviewed daily by the research team
to ensure accuracy. We have remained in contact with those
interviewed since and remain grateful for additional infor-
mation provided.
While focusing on the four sectors of cleanup, agricul-
ture, electric power systems and the rail network, we at-
tempt to combine our ﬁndings with measures of exposure to
tephra fall. In this way, by relating consequences to hazard
magnitude, we may help to better inform future risk anal-
yses. In doing this, we consider only the major tephra de-
position phase. Although eruptive activity continued after
this period, tephra accumulation to the southeast and north-
east was small and did not contribute greatly to observed
impacts.
5. Exposure Analysis
To consider the land-use types impacted by the erup-
tion, a recent cloud-free Landsat 5 image (Scene ID:
LT51120382009300BJC00; acquired on 2009-10-27) cov-
ering the study area was downloaded through the U.S. Geo-
logical Survey Global Visualization Viewer. It contained all
six multi-spectral bands at 30 m-resolution. Next, a stan-
dard, supervised image classiﬁcation approach (i.e. Maxi-
mum Likelihood Classiﬁer) was employed to classify two
major land covers of interest: agricultural land and settle-
ment (urban) areas. Two post-processing steps (i.e. ﬁltering
and masking) were used against the high-resolution base
imagery on Google Earth in order to improve the overall ac-
curacy of land cover determinations. OpenStreetMap road
maps and classiﬁcations were downloaded from Cloud-
Made; three train lines that intersected the tephra footprint
were digitised fromBing aerial imagery and simpliﬁed elec-
tricity transmission lines were digitised from information
provided by Kyushu Electric Power Company (KEPC).
Tephra isomass contours produced by AIST (2011) were
then overlaid so that land-use, road, electricity and rail ex-
posure could be estimated (Fig. 2; Tables 2–6). Total land
areas impacted for each municipality are summarised in Ta-
ble 2 and the agricultural, urban and total land areas im-
pacted within each municipality are shown in Table 3. It
must be noted that in some regional areas, such as Takaharu
Town, information is only available for national and prefec-
tural roads. Therefore, the total road length estimated (6880
km) is a lower bound estimate (Table 4). Also, distances
given for the electricity network are approximate only as
calculations were based on a schematic diagram provided
by KEPC (Fig. 2(d); Table 5). It was not possible to calcu-
late the exposed lengths of distribution networks <60 kV,
but it can be assumed that hundreds of kilometres of low
voltage circuits were affected.
6. Impacts of Tephra
In this section we focus on cleanup activities and impacts
to agriculture, electric power systems and the rail network
during the Shinmoedake eruption. We consider how resi-
dents and organisations managed these impacts and discuss
the success of these actions. When considering cleanup we
also make an attempt to quantify the costs, resources and
time associated with these activities.
6.1 Cleanup
6.1.1 Situation during eruption Approximately 106
km2 of urban land experienced some degree of tephra fall
(Table 3). From our observations and interviewee accounts,
tephra needed to be removed from most urban areas, with
particular attention made to clean the roofs of residential
and commercial buildings, paved areas and roads. Fine
tephra (ash) also contaminated the interior of buildings,
requiring repeated cleaning. The cleanup was compounded
by tephra being remobilised by wind and trafﬁc.
Signiﬁcantly, a total of 37 people were injured during
the eruption with all but one injury sustained during tephra
cleanup activities (Table 7). This is a common phenomena
following tephra fall in urban environments, having been
observed in Quito, Ecuador in 1999 and in Guatemala city,
Guatemala in 2010 (Leonard et al., 2005; Wardman et al.,
2012a).
Following the main period of tephra fall (26–27 January),
the removal of tephra from major roads was prioritised by
authorities to secure safe driving conditions. At various
times during the eruption, sections of the Miyazaki express-
way and several national and prefectural roads were closed
or had lower speed limits implemented due to reduced vis-
ibility from falling and remobilised material. In areas such
as Takaharu, local government prioritised maintaining func-
tionality of roads that might have been required in the case
of evacuation. To the best of our knowledge, there were no
reported road accidents as the result of tephra deposition.
The sewage network in the affected area was well sealed
and without cross connections, therefore eliminating signif-
icant tephra ingestion. There were some localised block-
ages of gutters and sediment traps due to clogging, but this
was remedied quickly by cleaning operations (Miyakonojo
City Ofﬁce, personal communication November 2011).
Roadside wastewater gutters also suffered some localised
blocking but were easily cleaned by shovel and mechanised
sweeper trucks. In homes, if pipes from roof gutters ran
directly to underwater pipes then residents were advised
to disconnect these. They were then left unconnected un-
til heavy rain in October when all tephra was ﬂushed from
the system (Takaharu Town Ofﬁce, personal communica-
tion November 2011).
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Fig. 2. Exposure maps created for (a) agricultural and urban land-usage (based on Landsat imagery); (b) road networks (OpenStreetMap); (c) rail lines
(digitised from aerial imagery)—Kitto Line (pink), Nippo Mainline (blue) and Nichinan Line (green); and (d) electricity distribution (schematic,
approximation of network provided by Kyushu Electric Power Company)—500 kV (pink), 220 kV (yellow), 110 kV (green) and 60 kV (blue), white
circles are transforming stations and black, hydro power plants. Isomass maps (AIST, 2011) shown in black have contour values equal to those in
Fig. 1.
6.1.2 Management Prior to the eruption there were
no speciﬁc plans for managing tephra cleanup efforts; how-
ever, local governments were well structured and individ-
ual department responsibilities were determined quickly.
Within Miyakonojo City Government, the Department of
General Affairs had overall responsibility for coordinating
cleanup activities with departments such as road construc-
tion and procurement also involved.
Road maintenance staff from Miyakonojo City Govern-
ment implemented four approaches for road cleanup, de-
pendent on location and tephra accumulation. On major
bypass roads where heavy trafﬁc had moved tephra to the
edges or where accumulation was small (i.e. less than sev-
eral kg/m2) then a single spray truck was used. In urban
areas, where tephra was thicker, cleanup required a spray
truck, road sweeper and dump trucks. Once tephra was
removed the road was sprayed again with water to pre-
vent remobilisation. The third approach was only employed
in agricultural areas where accumulation was particularly
large and simply involved using a front-end-loader to scoop
tephra from roads. Finally, where necessary, narrow res-
idential roads underwent manual cleaning with the use of
shovels, brushes and push-sweepers. No speciﬁc thresholds
were used for removing tephra from roads but if road mark-
ings were obscured then these roads were prioritised.
Beyond road cleanup, residents and businesses were re-
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Table 2. Total land area, tephra affected land area and percentage affected by municipality. Prefecture names are given in brackets.
Total land area (km2) Tephra affected area (km2) % tephra affected
Miyakonojo City (Miyazaki) 653.6 612.2 93.7
Nichinan City (Miyazaki) 536.9 536.9 100.0
Miyazaki City (Miyazaki) 644.9 326.9 50.7
Soo City (Kagoshima) 389.5 305.5 78.4
Kushima City (Miyazaki) 294.1 294.1 100.0
Shibushi City (Kagoshima) 288.7 217.6 75.4
Mimata Town (Miyazaki) 110.0 110.0 100.0
Kirishima City (Kagoshima) 603.7 107.3 17.8
Takaharu Town (Miyazaki) 86.3 36.8 42.6
Kobayashi City (Miyazaki) 474.6 11.5 2.4
Table 3. Agricultural (Ag), Urban (Ur) and Total (To) land areas (km2) impacted by each level of tephra accumulation identiﬁed by AIST (2011) for
each municipality. Total land areas affected for each municipality and accumulation range are in bold.
Tephra accumu-
lation (kg/m2) Miyakonojo Nichinan Miyazaki Soo Kushima Shibushi Mimata Kirishima Takaharu Kobayashi Total
0–0.5 Ag 49.1 0.0 65.9 86.7 37.4 57.0 0.0 9.3 8.7 0.0 314.0
Ur 2.1 0.0 22.1 5.2 5.4 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 38.9
To 178.1 4.0 299.2 290.1 193.0 200.9 0.0 94.2 19.2 2.1 1280.8
0.5–1 Ag 32.0 16.5 0.5 4.8 10.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 65.2
Ur 9.6 12.6 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.9
To 111.4 106.3 12.7 15.3 97.1 16.8 0.1 1.8 3.4 0.7 365.6
1–2 Ag 16.2 34.5 0.5 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 53.7
Ur 7.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.5
To 51.8 264.2 13.7 4.0 12.4 2.7 1.0 0.4 350.3
2–3 Ag 13.3 4.5 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 21.8
Ur 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3
To 50.6 113.6 1.3 22.4 1.9 1.7 0.4 192
3–5 Ag 24.6 1.2 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.9
Ur 5.7 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4
To 62.6 48.7 64.4 0.9 2.8 0.1 179.5
5–10 Ag 38.0 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.6
Ur 8.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5
To 73.5 10.7 0.6 1.9 0.2 86.9
10–30 Ag 26.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.3
Ur 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3
To 56.7 0.5 1.8 0.2 59.1
30–50 Ag 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
Ur 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
To 13.0 0.4 1.0 0.2 14.6
50–100 Ag 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7
Ur 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
To 8.4 0.8 0.2 0.1 9.5
>100 Ag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Ur 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
To 5.9 3.5 3.7 7.2 20.3
Total Ag 203 56.7 66.9 91.4 47.8 57.1 21.9 9.3 10.0 0.0
Ur 40.2 22.1 22.1 5.5 5.8 4.0 6.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
To 612.2 536.9 327 305.5 294.1 217.6 110.0 107.3 36.8 11.5
sponsible for the cleanup and collection of tephra within
their properties, although it was not until 30 January that
residents in Miyakonojo were advised through news media
that tephra would be collected as non-burnable rubbish. At
this time residents were asked not to mix tephra with other
rubbish or to wash it into drains. Businesses in Miyakonojo
on the other hand were required to transport tephra to a tem-
porary dumpsite in Yamada, approximately 12 km from the
central business district. In Takaharu, residents and busi-
nesses were advised to drop tephra at one of 250 existing
waste stations for compostable waste. The tephra was then
collected from these central points and brought to a desig-
nated dumpsite. Tephra from roofs, grounds and carparks
was typically collected in plastic bags and sacks, loaded
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Table 4. Approximate road lengths (km) impacted by various ranges of tephra accumulation (see Fig. 2(b)). Road maps and classiﬁcations from
OpenStreetMap; isomass contours from AIST (2011).
Tephra accumu-
lation (kg/m2) motorway trunk primary secondary tertiary urban rural all roads
0–0.5 59.7 139.0 238.0 196.3 347.9 1354.9 1342.1 3678.0
0.5–1 3.2 65.9 68.2 19.7 63.0 259.5 257.2 736.9
1–2 4.7 35.9 87.8 7.7 53.3 119.9 171.6 480.8
2–3 6.8 11.6 28.8 9.7 36.2 127.7 157.0 377.9
3–5 16.7 12.6 42.3 11.4 59.3 271.5 238.7 652.5
5–10 16.1 17.1 21.0 9.8 101.3 170.3 241.8 577.4
10–30 9.5 6.2 21.0 10.0 30.6 89.8 149.6 316.7
30–50 1.5 1.8 3.7 1.8 15.3 11.5 35.6
50–100 3.0 2.0 0.7 0.2 12.2 4.3 22.3
>100 2.0 2.0
Total 116.8 292.8 511.0 269.0 693.6 2423.1 2573.8 6880.1
Table 5. Estimated exposure of Kyushu Electric Power Company network to tephra fall; see Fig. 2(b). Approximations of electricity lines given by
KEPC and Isomass contours by AIST (2011).
Approximated length (km) Facilities affected
Tephra load (kg/m2) 500 kV 220 kV 110 kV 60 kV Hydro stations Transforming stations
0–0.5 3.4 59.3 28.3 44.6 3 8
0.5–1 5.5 4.4 12.2 1 1
1–2 3.3 1.3 16.2 2
2–3 4.6 1.8 10.9 1
3–5 4.9 2 16.6 1
5–10 5.2 2.4 21.2 2
10–30 5.5 4.3 1.5 1
Total 3.4 88.3 44.5 123.2 4 16
Table 6. Estimated exposure of rail lines and stations to tephra fall; see Fig. 2(c). Lines and stations digitised from Bing aerial imagery and Isomass
contours from AIST (2011).
Kitto line Nichinan line Nippo line
Tephra load (kg/m2) Length (km) Stations Length (km) Stations Length (km) Stations
0–0.5 6.32 2 41.80 17 48.63 9
0.5–1 0.63 0 20.14 5 6.83 2
1–2 0.42 0 26.37 5 2.66 0
2–3 3.07 0 5.15 1
3–5 4.36 2 5.83 1
5–10 3.69 1 6.22 2
10–30 3.93 1
Total 22.42 6 88.31 27 75.32 15
Table 7. Casualties reported during the Shinmoedake eruption (Source: Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2011, original data provided by Fire and Disaster Management
Agency, correct as of 7 March 2011).
Location Tephra accumulation Description of Injury Number of Causalities
(kg/m2) and Injury Severity
Major Minor
Miyakonojo City 10–30 Related to tephra removal, including falls 15 18
from ladders and roofs
Takaharu Town 2–20 Related to tephra removal, including slips 2 1
from steps
Kirishima City n/a Cut by window glass broken by shockwaves 1
Total 17 20
onto a truck and then emptied at the tephra dump site. This
was physically demanding and time consuming. Cleanup
for small businesses was a large undertaking typically in-
volving most staff members and often requiring overtime.
Large companies such as shopping centres employed con-
tractors immediately following the main eruptive phase to
undertake cleanup activities.
In both Miyakonojo and Takaharu provisions were made
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Fig. 3. Tephra fall amounts administered by Miyakonojo City Government. These values relate only to residential and public areas. Direct operations
are those carried out by Miyakonojo City Government staff and include public facilities and public housing. Outsourced operations are broken
down into those dealing with public facilities (including rubbish stations where residents brought tephra) and street collection of tephra collected by
residents from properties. Data provided by Miyakonojo City Government.
for those needing assistance, particularly elderly residents.
Takaharu town organised groups of trained volunteers such
as ﬁre-ﬁghters to work on roofs with teams of 5 people
cleaning 4 houses per day. It took from 7 February through
to mid-March for all identiﬁed properties to be attended
to. Volunteers were sourced both from within and beyond
Miyazaki Prefecture.
Regions in Japan that had previously experienced vol-
canic crises readily provided help and resources. In par-
ticular, 31,000 tephra collection bags were provided by
Shimabara, previously affected by Unzen volcano (1991–
1995), and 500,000 additional bags were sourced from
other prefectures (Takaharu Town ofﬁce, personal commu-
nication November 2011). These bags were made of strong
plastic and held about 10 kg of tephra. Support and ad-
vice on road-surface cleaning was provided by Kagoshima
City and vehicles were sent by the Ministry of Land, Infras-
tructure, Transport and Tourism (MLITT) from a number
of locations in Japan. However, local governments affected
by tephra fall were responsible for expenses such as wages
of operators and fuel. Earth moving machinery and dump
trucks were leased or supplied by local construction com-
panies.
During the eruption and whilst conducting cleanup ac-
tivities, it was observed that almost every person outside
wore a facemask to avoid breathing in ash. This is in large
part due to the strong culture in Japan of wearing face-
masks to protect against ﬂu, hay fever allergens and other
respiratory health concerns and masks being readily avail-
able. Workers involved in commercial cleanup activities
were well protected, with full face masks, helmets and full
body overalls in line with international best-practice (see:
www.ivhhn.org). However, the task for professional and
non-professional cleanup crews was physically demanding
and workers complained of injuries including back prob-
lems.
In addition to the use of tephra as landﬁll, several sec-
ondary uses were being trialled: a company in Miyakonojo
began production of reinforced bricks; a potter from Hyuga
city (north coast of Miyazaki Prefecture) had sourced quan-
tities of tephra; and, one community activity was a demon-
stration of the use of tephra in cooking meat to retain mois-
ture. Large sandbags (∼5 m3) were constructed and in-
stalled effectively by MLITT and local governments as an
emergency measure against lahar inundation. As of 12
April 2011, 1,850 bags were ﬁlled with 47 installed at
Haraigawa and 326 at Kamamutagawa (Takaharu Town, 6–
8 km from the vent).
6.1.3 Cleanup data analysis It is useful to consider
the amount of tephra dealt with by various cleanup op-
erations. Data for this purpose is available only for
Miyakonojo City (Fig. 3). In total, an estimated 1.52 × 106
kg of tephra was collected and removed by direct opera-
tions involving Miyakonojo City Government staff. This
included removal from government and public facilities in-
cluding public housing. The majority of cleanup activi-
ties were outsourced, with 42.14 × 106 kg of tephra re-
moved from public facilities and local waste stations, and
2.37 × 106 kg picked up from the street after collection by
residents from private properties. We assume these values
are only associated with cleanup of urban areas.
By considering the area and average accumulation of
tephra in Fig. 2(a), we can estimate that approximately
160 × 106 kg of tephra was deposited on urban land within
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Table 8. Numbers of vehicles sent to Miyakonojo City, Nichinan City, Takaharu Town, Kushima City, Kobayashi City, Mimata Town and Kirishima
City from prefectures outside the affected area (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011).
Vehicles sent Total vehicle-days Average vehicle-days
Sprinkler truck 31 675 21.8
Road sweeper 40 1,414 35.4
Management car 4 212 53.0
Total 75 2,301 30.7
Table 9. Costs of tephra cleanup related projects in Takaharu Town (Takaharu Town, 2011b).
Project Cost (JPY)
2010 Financial year (up to end March 2011)
Collection and transfer of tephra 2,688,000
Road cleanup operations 15,473,000
Manufacture of tephra-collection bags 2,399,000
Tephra removal from agricultural facilities 12,528,000
2011 Financial year (from April 2011)
Tephra collection 2,184,000
Miyakonojo. This allows us to approximate that 1% of
tephra was removed by direct municipal operations, 26% by
outsourced cleanup of public facilities and rubbish stations
and 1.5% by street collection. If these values are consis-
tent across the entire affected area then we may assume that
28.5% of the total fallen tephra in urban areas (estimated
as 1470 × 106 kg for the ﬁrst three days of the eruption)
was dealt with by government managed cleanup operations.
This is equal to approximately 420 × 106 kg or 420,000
tons of tephra. The tephra not accounted for here would
have been dealt with by businesses or other private organi-
sations, removed by road cleanup operations, been washed
or blown elsewhere or remains in place. Cleanup of pub-
lic facilities occurred quickly with most tephra removed in
February and then decreasing amounts in following months.
However, street collection was slower, not beginning un-
til March with the largest amounts collected during April
(Fig. 3).
Takaharu Town Hall advised that it took one week to
clean major roads but that cleaning of minor agricultural
roads was not completed until late March. Takaharu Town
Hall advised that they were responsible for cleaning 307.4
km of roads. Small sweeper trucks covered 39.6 km (1.6
km/day) and large sweepers 267.8 km (3.9 km/day). This
means that in total 44 sweeper days were needed; although,
it is unclear how many sweeper trucks were available.
A number of vehicles were dispatched to the affected
area from outside prefectures (Table 8). In addition to ve-
hicles, 127 liaison ofﬁcers were sent from other regions to
the Miyazaki Prefecture Ofﬁce between 26 January and 31
March, although it is unclear how long each person was
based in the area. In this initiative, road surface cleanup
was conducted between 27 January and 23 February with an
estimated 2,324 m3 of tephra collected (Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011).
By considering the total length of roads affected, we may
approximate the volume of tephra removed from roads. It
is difﬁcult to estimate a minimum volume of tephra that
required roads to be cleaned, as vehicles were often re-
sponsible for removing tephra to the side of the road prior
to any specialised cleaning. However, personal correspon-
dence with Tarumizu City Hall (2007), who received fre-
quent tephra falls from Sakurajima volcano, suggested that
a threshold of 0.5 kg/m2 was sufﬁcient for road markings to
be obscured. We therefore assume this threshold here and
estimate the total road accumulation to be approximately
95 × 106 kg. Note that local roads in more rural areas are
not included in this value.
In terms of the costs of cleanup activities, we again only
have very limited data from which to draw any conclusions.
Table 9 lists the costs of projects related to cleanup for Taka-
haru Town. These values relate to the costs incurred to
the town, i.e. they exclude costs to businesses. From ex-
posure calculations, we remind the reader that 36.8 km2 of
land area was tephra affected in Takaharu (all <0.5 kg/m2),
which equates to 42.6% of the total land area. Of this, 10
km2 was agricultural land and only 0.1 km2 urban. We ap-
ply a road length equal to 307.4 km.
Tephra collection in Takaharu to the end March 2011,
including the manufacture of bags but excluding road
and agricultural facility operations, cost 5,087,000 JPY
(∼66,000 USD) (Table 9), and the total amount of tephra
collected by individuals as at 25 March was estimated to
be 221,720 kg (Takaharu Town, 2011c). We can therefore
estimate that cleanup for urban areas cost approximately 23
JPY (0.30 USD) per kg. Road cleanup operations can be es-
timated to have cost approximately 50,300 JPY (650 USD)
per km or 17 JPY (0.22 USD) per kg, assuming an aver-
age road width of 6 m and average tephra accumulation of
0.5 kg/m2.
6.2 Agriculture
Within several days of the onset of the eruption and dur-
ing our ﬁrst visit to the area, tephra had been deposited
across an estimated 564 km2 of agricultural land, with 30
km2 exposed to >10 kg/m2 (Fig. 2(a) and Table 3). At this
time the greatest concerns were of effects to crops that were
still growing or ready for harvest as well as physical and
chemical fertility changes to soils.
Agricultural extension agencies, Japan Agriculture (JA,
a farmers’ cooperative), the Agriculture Improvement and
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Table 10. Summary of agricultural damage from the 2011 Shinmoedake eruption (as of 31 March 2011) (Agriculture Improvement and Promotion
Centre, 2011). Original data provided by Department of Agricultural Policy and Fisheries of Miyazaki Prefecture.
Damaged area Damage Value
(thousand JPY)





Agricultural lands (soil) 665 farms 595,000
Fisheries 1 farm 1,000
Total 1,204,000
Promotion Centre (AIPC) and the Farming Support Divi-
sion of Miyazaki Prefecture, undertook extensive crop im-
pact assessments and analysed the composition of tephra
and its effect on soils. These groups also provided best-
practice mitigation and remediation advice and managed
damage claims from farmers. Utilising excellent pre-
eruption records, the magnitude of the impacts were able
to be estimated and needs assessed to facilitate central gov-
ernment aid. The total cost to the agricultural sector was
estimated at 1,204 million JPY (∼15.5 million USD), split
between reduced or lost crop production and damage to
agricultural land requiring rehabilitation (Table 10) (De-
partment of Agricultural Policy and Fisheries of Miyazaki
Prefecture, 2011).
Approximately 1 billion JPY (13 million USD) was pro-
vided to Miyazaki prefecture by central government for
agricultural cleanup operations. As only one season of out-
door crops had been lost and the majority of ﬁelds were
fallow, or hadn’t yet been planted, no ﬁnancial support was
given for crop losses. However, as greenhouse crops and
tea crops were still growing, cleanup support was provided
for this sub-sector. Qualifying farmers were required to
pay one third of the cost with the remainder funded from
the subsidy up to a cap of 1 million JPY (13,000 USD).
Required products, such as air-blowers and water-sprayers,
were purchased and distributed by JA and AIPC but this of-
ten took several days to weeks due to the high demand.
6.3 Outdoor crops
6.3.1 Impacts The time of year that the eruption oc-
curred was crucial in determining what impacts were sus-
tained by the agricultural sector (also see, Wilson and Cole,
2007). Many crops in the area had been harvested in
November/December and the ﬁelds were fallow. How-
ever, crops such as potatoes and burdock root had recently
been planted and spinach crops were ready for harvest.
Our observations and reports from interviewees suggested
that, generally, any exposed crop suffered tephra adher-
ence (Fig. 4), often leading to deﬁciency in photosynthet-
ically active radiation and acid leaching damage. In par-
ticular, ﬁne grained, sharp tephra particles strongly ad-
hered to the leaves of most crops, including waxy leaved
spinach and tea, making cleaning difﬁcult. Effects were
wide ranging, depending on the stage of crop development.
In some instances, abrasion occurred during windy con-
ditions, cleaning and harvest. High terminal velocities of
relatively coarse-grained tephra (sand-sized) caused bruis-
ing and shredding in some locations, particularly of young
seedlings.
Accumulations of more than 10 kg/m2 led to smother-
ing and limb breakage in leafy ground crops (e.g. spinach,
potatoes, etc.). In general the quality and quantity of harvest
were reduced and was loosely correlated with tephra accu-
mulation. In extreme cases the harvest failed and the crop
was written off. Unmarketable crops were ploughed into
ﬁelds as mulch. Table 11 summarises damage observations
and mitigation actions. The most severe impacts to outdoor
crops were 665 farms classiﬁed as being ‘buried’ by tephra
(typically where falls exceeded 10 kg/m2), which required
the rehabilitation of soils. This could be broken down to
308 rice paddies (224 ha) and 357 cultivated ‘ﬁelds’ (620
ha) (Department of Agricultural Policy and Fisheries of
Miyazaki Prefecture, 2011).
Initial analysis of the tephra by AIPC established high
levels of available sulphur, which was feared would pro-
duce H2S and reduce soil pH and chemical soil fertility,
particularly for rice paddies sensitive to high levels of S and
low pH. Such changes to soil chemistry by andesitic tephra
fall were observed following the 1995 Ruapehu eruptions
in New Zealand (Cronin et al., 1998). However, agricul-
tural ofﬁcials and farmers reported that the Shinmoedake
tephra appeared to have limited, if any, affects on soil pH
in the 3–6 months following the initial tephra falls, partic-
ularly following rehabilitation (see below). The tephra was
not reported to have affected crops planted following the
eruption.
Tephra accumulation greater than 10 kg/m2 reportedly re-
duced water inﬁltration due to a semi-impermeable crust
layer forming. Whilst this would also have acted much
like a mulch to retain moisture, farmers reported that when
coupled with a following dry period, this led to moisture
stress on crops. This is consistent with experiences follow-
ing thick tephra deposition after the 1991 Hudson eruption
in Chile and Argentina (Wilson et al., 2011).
6.3.2 Management In general, losses to individual
farms were considered to be relatively low, due to farm-
ers taking appropriate mitigation measures, coupled with
a cleanup and rehabilitation subsidy from central govern-
ment. Mitigation efforts for agriculture and horticulture fo-
cused on two broad themes: 1) removing tephra from estab-
lished plants and 2) removing (striping) or ploughing tephra
into soils.
In general, farmers reported that the faster they undertook
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Fig. 4. Spinach and cabbage crops in Yamada damaged by tephra (2 February 2011). Photo in top left shows a typical home garden in the area while
the other three show rows of vegetables in small farms.
mitigation actions the better the outcome. For example,
JA stated that potato farmers experienced 10% losses in
the June harvest yield where cleaning and tephra removal
occurred within days of tephra fall, compared to 30–50%
losses where no mitigation measures were taken.
Some farmers used air blowers and water sprayers to
remove tephra from plants; with particular attention paid
to spinach and tea crops (Table 11). This was time con-
suming and often not considered cost effective. However,
established tea farms successfully used a modiﬁed self-
propelled sprayer (four purchased with government aid) to
wash plants. This method had been developed for use in
Kagoshima to mitigate frequent tephra falls from Sakura-
jima volcano. The mitigation efforts were credited with a
minimal reduction in production during the following sea-
son.
It was recommended by AIPC that tephra deposits <3
cm (∼33 kg/m2) be mixed into the soil through standard
cultivation practices and that when >3 cm should be re-
moved where possible to avoid a reduction in soil fertility.
The following procedure was recommended by AIPC for
ash affected farms:
1) Tephra be removed from ﬁelds and channels (particu-
larly when 3 cm or greater).
2) Deep ploughing or over-turning (15 cm for rice pad-
dies, 20 cm or greater for ﬁelds) to mix and bury the
tephra and in order to avoid creating a sandy texture.
It was suggested that this could then be followed by
a rotary hoe to aerate the soil; however, this step was
generally avoided due to fears of bringing tephra back
to the surface. Tilling was also avoided as it did not
adequately bury the tephra.
3) Mg-CaCO3-based fertiliser added to mitigate acidity
(0.5 to 1.0 t/ha). For rice paddies this was to be fol-
lowed by application of Fe fertiliser to suppress H2S.
4) Organic material (manure) added to offset reduc-
tions in Cation Exchange Capacity (CEC) and water-
holding capacity.
5) On-going monitoring of soil fertility characteristics.
In many cases, rice paddies could not have their soil base
broken by cultivation, so removal of tephra by scrapping
was the only treatment option available. This was inefﬁcient
due to the rough surface caused by stumps of rice; however,
no yield reductions were reported.
The resource intensive procedure of tephra removal ex-
ceeded the capacity of many farmers. Removing tephra
from paddocks required larger machines than most farm-
ers owned and local contractors did not have sufﬁcient re-
sources to meet demand. Despite government ﬁnancial as-
sistance, only a small proportion of farmers were able to
clear their land of tephra and many ended up simply mixing
all the fallen tephra into the soil, even with up to 10 kg/m2
accumulation.
The management of collected tephra was viewed by
farmers as one of the more signiﬁcant challenges during the
eruption. Where needed, farmers used dump trucks, bull-
dozers and loaders to strip tephra from ﬁelds. When time
allowed, tephra was added to that collected from building
roofs, and eventually moved to a collection point (near the
road) where the council would collect it with heavy machin-
ery. Others who didn’t have the time or resources to move
it simply stockpiled the tephra in unused areas on farms or
on a part of a paddock that was sacriﬁced.
Cultivation machinery was reportedly mostly unaffected
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Fig. 5. Greenhouse affected by tephra in Yamada (2 February 2011). Photo on the left shows piles of tephra already removed from valleys in the
greenhouse roof and, on the right, tephra still remaining on the roof.
by operating in tephra deposits, although operators often
increased the frequency of maintenance.
6.4 Greenhouse horticulture
6.4.1 Impacts Greenhouse agriculture is common in
the study area. Farms with greenhouses are typically
smaller in area than open-air equivalents, with some wholly
reliant on greenhouses for production, whilst others com-
bine open-air (sub-aerial) production. Greenhouses are con-
structed on a light metal frame with a clear vinyl cover,
and have mechanical cranks to open panels for ventila-
tion. Roofs are domed with ‘v’ shaped valleys between
spans (Fig. 5). Experiences during the eruption suggested
the greenhouses provided effective protection from direct
tephra fall; however, tephra accumulated on the shallow
pitched roofs and, in particular, between roof spans reduced
solar radiation levels inside the greenhouse, resulting in re-
duced crop growth rates. Only in rare instances did the vinyl
coverings break or tear due to tephra loading; and where
tears did develop, they tended to be due to abrasion where
the vinyl vents slid along the greenhouse’s metal frame.
Within 10 km of the volcano, clasts (>10 mm) punched
holes in the vinyl of several greenhouses, with 10 requiring
remediation (Department of Agricultural Policy and Fish-
eries of Miyazaki Prefecture, 2011).
Tephra loads on the vents inhibited opening and there-
fore aeration. The combination of reduced light levels and
increased humidity increased the prevalence of disease. In-
terviewees noted that it was fortunate the eruption occurred
in winter, as failure to ventilate greenhouses during the hu-
mid and hot summers conditions would have caused more
signiﬁcant problems. It was found that the low level of sun-
light entering the greenhouse also reduced the performance
of bees used to pollinate strawberries and other crops.
Most signiﬁcantly, farmer’s efforts were diverted towards
cleanup. Farms were often staffed by only two, often el-
derly, people and crop quality was reduced as removal of
tephra from greenhouses was prioritised over tasks such as
cultivation and tending crops.
6.4.2 Management The major action required was
the removal and cleaning of tephra from greenhouses with
most attention needed to remove tephra accumulated in the
valleys between spans (e.g. images in Fig. 5). Air blow-
ers were used when accumulation in the valleys was less
than approximately 5 kg/m2 and this was often followed
by washing with water. Where tephra exceeded 5 kg/m2,
shovels and wheelbarrows were employed. This was time
consuming, with typical clearance rates for two people of
approximately 1 hour per metre. Greenhouse roof construc-
tion contributed greatly to the task of cleanup and may also
have been vulnerable to failure in the case of thicker falls.
In tephra fall prone areas such as Miyazaki, it may be nec-
essary to consider single spans in roof design.
It was prohibitively expensive for farmers to hire pro-
fessional contractors, whose specialists skills were also re-
quired for assisting high priority tasks such as cleaning and
maintenance of critical infrastructure. Farmers approached
JA and AIPC for assistance, but these organisations did
not have the human resources to assist on the scale re-
quired. Local college students volunteered to assist; how-
ever, management, support, and health and safety consider-
ations meant their offer was declined.
6.5 Forage crops
6.5.1 Impacts The most common forage crops in the
affected area were Italian ryegrass and corn. The eruption
occurred at a vulnerable time for livestock farmers with
grasses recently germinating and becoming established.
Where grasses were taller than the tephra deposit thickness,
they typically continued to grow through tephra success-
fully. However, where tephra accumulation was sufﬁciently
large, and grass short, crops were smothered (Table 11).
Tephra contamination of grass was still a signiﬁcant issue
during harvest (in April, 3 months after the main tephra
fall), prompting a recommendation from JA that fresh grass
not be used for feeding animals. Dried grass (hay) was rec-
ommended as shaking during cutting and baling removed
most of the tephra.
6.5.2 Management Where forage crops were lost,
ﬁelds appeared to be remediated quickly and successfully.
As one example, Miyazaki Prefecture Public Livestock Cor-
poration (MPPLC), who manages 150 ha of farms several
kilometres from the volcano, received 7–10 kg/m2 of tephra
as well as occasional clasts up to 7 cm in diameter. Most
of the farm’s forage crops were buried, with soils under-
going deep ploughed to 60–70 cm as a ﬁrst step in reme-
diation. A rotary hoe was then used for seedbed prepa-
ration. Nitrogen-Phosphorus-Potassium (N-P-K) fertiliser
was added with the seed, but suggested Mg-CaCO3 could
not be sourced quickly and planting proceeded without it.
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Fig. 6. Shinmoedake tephra (SDKE-11) non-soluble deposit density plotted against equivalent soluble deposit density. Other tephras plotted for
comparison include: August 2012 eruption of Tongariro volcano, New Zealand (TONG-12); January 2009 eruption of Soufriere Hills, Montserrat
(SHIL-09); June 2008 eruption of Chaiten volcano, Chile (CHTN-08); June 1996 eruption of Ruapehu volcano, New Zealand (RUAP-96); and
synthetic “pseudo-tephra” (see Broom, 2010). Figure adapted from Wardman et al. (2013).
A one-off crop of oats and Sudan grass was planted to grow
quickly and have high nutrition value; this was harvested in
July. Any contamination to the oats/Sudan grass from on-
going light tephra falls or remobilisation of existing tephra
deposits did not cause any signiﬁcant additional damage to
forage or affect livestock health.
6.6 Livestock
6.6.1 Impacts Despite a large number of livestock
farms exposed to tephra fall, few problems were reported.
Direct exposure to tephra was minimal as livestock are
mostly kept indoors and tephra did not contaminate the
covered feeding stalls or water troughs. Impacts were
largely limited to forage crops (see section above) and
instances where large clasts penetrated plastic corrugated
roofs spooking livestock. A total of 207 lightly constructed
cowsheds and forage warehouses were either damaged or
collapsed under the weight of tephra (Department of Agri-
cultural Policy and Fisheries of Miyazaki Prefecture, 2011).
6.6.2 Management Two cattle farms were evacuated
beyond the tephra-affected area due to clast impacts to barn
roofs. This evacuation was coordinated by JA who pro-
vided non-ﬁnancial support including human resources and
trucks. Many of these livestock still remained on host farms
nine months later to avoid further stress to animals.
Where necessary, due to loss of forage crops, farmers
fed livestock from supplementary feed reserves (e.g. round
silage bales and silage bunkers), with most farmers having
up to two months reserve supply. Once these supplies were
exhausted, clean supplementary feed was purchased, but at
a high cost as it was out of season.
6.7 Electric power systems
6.7.1 Impacts Kyushu Electric Power Company
(KEPC) manages the generation, transmission and distribu-
tion of electricity throughout Kyushu. In the tephra-affected
area, the network consists of a series of transmission lines
(above ground towers with suspended 110, 220 and 500
kV circuits) that connect hydroelectric, thermal and nuclear
generation stations with large industrial users and a dis-
persed distribution network. Voltages are stepped down to
66 kV for distribution networks, stepped down again to 6
kV for zone distribution, and to 200 V and 100 V for urban
and rural domestic customers. Insulators on KEPC’s trans-
mission and distribution networks are typically ceramic,
which is common globally. However, to protect against in-
dustrial pollution contamination, extra long insulator strings
are used on 110, 200 and 500 kV circuits; the 6 kV distribu-
tion systems are protected by polyethylene jackets and 200
V and 100 V insulators have vinyl jackets.
During the Shinmoedake eruption over 136 km of High-
Voltage (HV) transmission circuits (>67 kV) and 123 km
of 60 kV circuit were exposed to tephra fall (Table 5). Sig-
niﬁcantly, there was a period of light misty rain from 7 to
10 February, which moistened deposits remaining on insu-
lators, increasing the conductivity of deposits and thus the
likelihood of insulator ﬂashover (Wardman et al., 2012b).
There were no direct disruptions to the KEPC HV trans-
mission network (generation sites, lines or transformer fa-
cilities) as the result of tephra fall, although over 24 km
of circuits and transforming stations were exposed to more
than 3 kg/m2 of tephra, and 10 km to over 10 kg/m2
(Fig. 2(d) and Table 5).
There were no reports of leakage current or ﬂashovers on
the 66 kV or 6 kV networks. However, some leakage and
ﬂashovers were reported on the 200V and 100V distribu-
tion system. From the beginning of the eruption through to
24 May, KEPC received 54 reports from customers of elec-
tricity leakage (strong crackling or arcing sound) and 29 re-
ports of ﬂashover causing disruption of supply from the lo-
cal transformer to the customer. The vast majority of these
incidents occurred at connection points or where the insu-
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lator’s jacket cover had been scratched or abraded. Most of
the reports occurred between 7 and 10 February during the
period of light rain. Most reported problems ceased follow-
ing heavy rain on 10 February suggesting that most tephra
was washed off equipment during this time.
Pristine tephra was collected in various locations in
Miyakonojo City between 28 January and 3 February
and equivalent salt deposit density (ESDD) measurements,
taken as a measure of contamination potential, were made
using the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
60815 site pollution severity guidelines (IEC, 2008). Fig-
ure 6 shows non-soluble deposit density (NSDD) vs. ESDD
with Shinmoedake tephra compared against other tephra
fall deposits (from Wardman et al., 2013). Results indi-
cate that more than 3 mm (3.3 kg/m2, assuming a deposit
density of 1100 kg/m2 (AIST, 2011)) of the Shinmoedake
tephra can be considered a very heavy contaminant for
electrical insulators, according to IEEE (1979) (the global
standard for contaminant severity in electrical engineering).
The Shinmoedake tephra plots within the middle range of
ESDD/NSDD values when compared to tephras from other
eruptions analysed by Wardman et al. (2013).
The ESDD/NSDD analysis suggests that, when wet, the
tephra was highly conductive. However, the lack of noted
disruptions suggests that the tephra was never wetted suf-
ﬁciently to increase conductivity or cause adherence to in-
sulator components. The ﬁrst rain was not until 7–10 days
after the main falls, allowing time for natural cleaning by
wind. KEPC cleaning of tephra-contaminated insulators
had also occurred in many substations before this time.
On distribution networks tephra exposure did not create
a widespread problem, possibly highlighting the value of
anti-pollution protection on insulators.
Several Hydroelectric Power (HEP) Generation Facilities
and their catchments were exposed to tephra falls through-
out the eruption. The ﬁrst problems to manifest were that
rain gauges ﬁlled with tephra at climate stations through-
out the river catchments. These required regular cleaning to
keep the stations functional in monitoring catchment rain-
fall intensities. Two HEP stations, Nojiri (approximately 16
km northeast of the vent) and Mizonokuchi (approximately
15 km southeast of the vent), experienced thick tephra falls
in their catchments, which required a lahar monitoring pro-
gram to be initiated. Following the heavy rainfall on 10
February it was decided that these two stations be shut down
and water was bypassed between 10 and 11 February as a
precautionary measure. The small dam size of the two HEP
stations allowed tephra laden water to clear quickly and,
therefore, shutdown- and restart-operations to occur with-
out incident.
6.7.2 Management On 27 January, following the ini-
tial tephra fall, KEPC staff began to patrol generation, trans-
mission and distribution networks. Operational tempo was
increased, including more frequent internal communication
and cleaning of tephra contaminated assets; however, acti-
vation of specialist emergency management groups within
the company was not required. Trafﬁc disruptions during
this period increased the time it took ﬁeld crews to com-
plete tasks.
On 1 February, KEPC began to de-energise (shut down)
some facilities for precautionary cleaning of transformers,
following accumulation of several centimetres of tephra on
transformer insulators. This was not triggered by excessive
tephra accumulation; rather it was due to a warning that
the exclusion zone was to be extended making it unclear
when access to some sites would be restored. Cleaning took
place while rerouting through other circuits and without
disrupting the supply of electricity to customers.
On transmission networks, cleaning was mostly re-
stricted to substation facilities. A special hot-stick (insu-
lated pole) was developed with a compressed air line at-
tached for live (energised) cleaning. A hot-stick with a
high-pressure water line was also developed, but due to the
uncertain conductivity of tephra at the time, this was only
used when the system was de-energised. When facilities
were de-energised, tephra could also be wiped off surfaces
with a cloth where practical. There was some beneﬁt from
rain cleaning accumulated tephra, but it was unclear to what
extent.
In some parts of the affected area there is a well-
established program of live (energised) insulator cleaning
to minimise insulator contamination from sea salt, which
KEPC staff believed reduced the likelihood of tephra in-
duced ﬂashover. In addition, some lines also have an auto-
washing system to remove sea salts, whilst others use a
higher rated (longer) insulator to provide greater insulation.
Cleaning was not undertaken on distribution lines due to
the extensive networks and high remaining functionality. A
reactive approach was adopted where any report from the
public of leakage current or ﬂashover was responded to and
a program of limited energised water cleaning of insulators
was initiated.
6.8 Rail network
6.8.1 Impacts JR Kyushu Railway Company is re-
sponsible for much of the rail network within Kyushu, with
an estimated 186 km of rail and 48 stations affected to
some degree by tephra during the Shinmoedake eruption
(Fig. 2(c) and Table 6). Train cancellations and delays oc-
curred on the Nippo Mainline, Kitto Line and Nichinan
Line (Fig. 2(c)) between 26 and 28 January with cancel-
lations on the Kitto Line occurring through to 5 February
(Table 12). Two key problems affected train services during
the eruption: the mechanical failure of track switches due to
a build up of tephra and loss of electrical contact between
track and train wheels disrupting communications. Also of
concern to the company was the additional risk posed by
potential lahars. It was determined that if an evacuation call
was made then all services would be stopped in the haz-
ardous area.
The rail system operates where electrical signals are com-
municated to trains through the tracks. Operators can near-
continuously follow where each carriage is for safe and ef-
ﬁcient operation of the network. If the signal is lost then
an emergency system is activated and the train is brought to
a stop. During the Shinmoedake eruption, tephra acted as
a barrier between the wheels and the tracks inhibiting the
signal. It was therefore essential for tracks to be cleaned
so that operations could continue. This was the most sig-
niﬁcant service disruption experienced during the eruption.
There did not seem to be a critical threshold where con-
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Table 12. Summary of rail cancellations and delays during the Shinmoedake eruption. Data provided by JR Kyushu (November 2011).
Date Operations suspended Cancelled services Delayed services
Line Section Reason Time (Including partial) Cases Minutes
26 January Kitto Yoshimatsu–Miyakonojo switch failure 17:53–last 6
Nippo Tano–Kokubu switch failure 17:15–last 48 5 27–1336
Nichinan Miyazaki–Shibushi switch failure 18:05–last 10
27 January Kitto Yoshimatsu–Miyakonojo switch failure All day 18
lost connection
Nippo Tano–Kokubu switch failure All day 73 15 5–796
lost connection
Nichinan Miyazaki–Shibushi switch failure All day 30 2 29–35
lost connection
28 January Kitto Yoshimatsu–Miyakonojo lost connection First–21:30 19
Nippo Tano–Kokubu lost connection First–9:04 19 6 42–174
Nichinan Miyazaki–Shibushi lost connection First–9:06 14 3 13–33
30 January Kitto Tanigashira Station 12:37–14:08 2
*safety equipment failure
31 January Kitto Yoshimatsu–Miyakonojo switch failure 13:20–last 17
lost connection
1 February Kitto Yoshimastu–Miyakonojo switch failure 12:24–last 20
lost connection
2 February Kitto Yoshimatsu–Miyakonojo switch failure First–11:35 6
lost connection
5 February Kitto Takaharu Station lost connection 6:30–10:15 4
*safety equipment failure
nection was lost, and JR Kyushu therefore considered any
tephra on the track sufﬁcient to cancel services and begin
cleaning operations. Whether tephra was wet or dry did not
inﬂuence the occurrence of this impact.
In addition to the mechanical failure of track switches,
accumulated tephra inﬁltrated gravel ballast under the
tracks, reducing cushioning properties. This meant the bal-
last had to be replaced more frequently than usual, costing
JR Kyushu as estimated 66 million JPY (850,000 USD).
With an estimated 186 km of track impacted (Table 6),
this equates to approximately 355,000 JPY (4,600 USD)
per km.
Prior to the eruption, JR Kyushu recently installed 360-
degree lights at crossings, which allowed drivers and others
to see that the crossing was operating correctly. The sys-
tem is activated by the train as it passes over a sensor. A
backup sensor is installed on the carriages at a point before
the crossing, although not on all crossings. Between 28 and
31 January this backup system was activated 39 times, sug-
gesting that the initial system was not working effectively
due to tephra accumulation.
6.8.2 Management JR Kyushu Railway Company
has had considerable experience in dealing with tephra from
frequent eruptions at Sakurajima volcano (Fig. 1). Several
methods were previously implemented to deal with impacts
from Sakurajima including using lower viscosity oil in track
switches to avoid clogging and employing a sprinkler sys-
tem to clean tephra from tracks on the Kagoshima route of
the high speed Kyushu Shinkansen. However, tephra fall
from Shinmoedake caused far greater problems for the com-
pany due to the large volume deposited over a short period
of time. Company representatives reported to us that the
scale of disruptions from this eruption was not expected;
however, it was evident that through past experiences they
were in an excellent position to manage the impacts.
An established protocol following eruptions from Saku-
rajima was that staff would be sent out to assess the switches
and tracks each morning before the ﬁrst train. If any tephra
was on the tracks, then services would be cancelled until
tracks could be cleaned. During the Shinmoedake eruption,
this required a large number of staff and, in the early stages
of the eruption, JR Kyushu was concerned about the sus-
tainability of this approach as it was unclear how long the
activity would continue.
Cleanup of the tracks and other critical areas was primar-
ily carried out by JR staff members with additional staff
brought in from Kagoshima, whilst contractors were used
for secondary areas such as platforms. Tephra was usu-
ally blown or washed off the tracks—not collected. A car-
riage, developed from experiences with Sakurajima, was
brought in which sprayed water onto the tracks to remove
tephra. However, in secondary cleanup areas tephra was
collected by the contractors and transported to the regular
tephra dump locations. Tephra entering carriages meant
that more frequent cleaning was required but no damage
was reported. Larger problems were possibly avoided due
to services typically not operating in ashy conditions.
Many tasks were outsourced to contractors including the
replacement of ballast, dredging of tephra from ditches to
the side of tracks, the dismantling and cleanup of track
joints and switches, and removal of tephra from the sur-
face of roads around 36 crossings (needing to be carried out
twice). Other maintenance tasks conducted by JR Kyushu
were increased, including the cleaning of tephra from rain-
fall gauges, electric substations and train components such
as transformers and motors.
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An additional signiﬁcant challenge identiﬁed by JR
Kyushu was the need to disseminate information regard-
ing delays and cancellations. It was uncertain how long
the eruption would continue for and how much of the rail
network would receive tephra fall requiring cancellation of
services. Therefore, communicating this through various
forms (e.g. media, websites, etc.) was a signiﬁcant task that
required sensitivity.
7. Discussion
During our ﬁrst visit to the area, immediately following
the main tephra falls of 26–27 January, residents and busi-
ness owners were unsure about future eruptive activity and
potential extended impacts and disruptions. Although the
worst of the tephra had fallen at this time remobilised tephra
was adding to the task of cleanup. In this largely agricul-
tural area, farmers were not only concerned about the loss
of current crops but also longer-term impacts to soil produc-
tivity. There were substantial concerns from residents and
business owners that if the eruption was to continue pro-
ducing high volumes of tephra, the ability to manage, clean
and recover would be exceeded. Our second visit however,
highlighted the resilience of the community and success of
management strategies implemented. This effective recov-
ery was aided by the relatively short eruption duration.
During the eruption crises, local government ofﬁces were
organising a number of ‘countermeasure’ (mitigation) ac-
tivities and tackling a broad range of arising issues that had
not been anticipated. In particular, cleanup efforts were be-
ing delayed due to uncertainty regarding where tephra could
be taken. However, organisations exhibited high levels of
adaptive capacity to respond to the event, a contributing
positive element being well-resourced and well-staffed mu-
nicipal organisations. Many organisations (including agri-
culture, infrastructure and local government) were able to
utilise regional and national networks to obtain information
on tephra fall impacts and recovery strategies.
7.1 Cleanup
As highlighted here, a fall of just a few millimetres of
tephra within an urban area requires the need for collection
and disposal of large quantities of material in order to re-
store full functionality to road networks, airports, private
properties and public places. Prompt cleanup reduces re-
mobilisation of tephra, which minimises on-going disrup-
tions and public health concerns. In the case discussed here,
despite the relatively short eruption duration and efﬁcient
management, cleanup operations extended into September
and beyond (Fig. 3). Residents and organisations in areas
subjected to future tephra fall events may therefore expect
many months of cleanup requirements, exacerbated by ad-
ditional falls and remobilised material.
In extremely thick falls, tephra exceeding 100 kg/m2 puts
structures at risk of the onset of structural damage and col-
lapse (Blong, 2003; Spence et al., 2005). During this rel-
atively short eruption, these thicknesses were not exceeded
in populated areas and only some lightly constructed, long-
span livestock shelters and barns in Miike, proximal to
the volcano (50–100 kg/m2 tephra accumulation), suffered
structural damage due to tephra loading. However, it was
desirable to remove lesser thicknesses of tephra from roofs
to avoid the possibility of corrosion of rooﬁng materials,
blocking of gutters or ingress of tephra into the roof cav-
ity (Blong, 1981). During the Shinmoedake eruption, res-
idents and workers were responsible of removing tephra
from roofs; although assistance was offered to the elderly
and others requiring assistance. Although help was most
often provided by family members and neighbours, an im-
portant consideration for future events is that both volunteer
assistance and the efﬁcient management of volunteers will
be required.
A signiﬁcant observation was the performance of the well
sealed sewage and water supply networks, which were not
cross connected and remained functional throughout the
eruption and cleanup operations. The prompt and sustained
cleanup of urban environments further reduced any disrup-
tion to these networks. In joint sewage-storm water net-
works, or where the sewage system has breaks, tephra has
been known to enter the sewage system and block pipes
and sumps, cause accelerated wear on motors and pumps,
and seriously damage wastewater treatment plants (Wilson
et al., 2012a); however, by eliminating ingestion this was
successfully avoided. Likewise, water in the area is primar-
ily sourced from deep wells and was therefore not exposed
to or contaminated by tephra.
7.2 Agriculture
It is well established that agriculture is vulnerable to the
physical and chemical effects of tephra, with impacts to
vegetation, soil, animal health, human health and essential
farm machinery and infrastructure all having been recorded
(e.g. Cook et al., 1981; Blong, 1984; Neild et al., 1998;
Cronin et al., 1998; Annen and Wagner, 2003; Ort et al.,
2008; Wilson et al., 2011). A review byWilson et al. (2011)
identiﬁed a diverse range of agricultural impacts that are
controlled by the physical and chemical characteristics of
tephra, including the volume, rate and frequency of falls,
environmental conditions pre- and post-tephra fall, mitiga-
tion measures employed and the pre-eruption condition of
farms. During the andesitic Shinmoedake eruption (Suzuki
et al., 2013), smothering, lodging, adherence blocking pho-
tosynthesis and abrasion of crops by tephra; coverage of soil
and changes to soil properties; and loading and coverage of
greenhouses were the most signiﬁcant impacts.
Chemical impacts were seemingly less severe than phys-
ical damage, which we speculate was due to the eruption
occurring when many crops were not at a sensitive stage
or ﬁelds were in fallow. However, the high quality stan-
dards expected by Japanese consumers were an additional
challenge for farmers. Acid damage was observed to af-
fect leaf vegetables which reduced or voided product value,
despite them being ﬁt for consumption. When crops, such
as spinach and tea, were intended for processing then this
proceeded if chemical damage was not severe. Later, some
damaged vegetables were purchased by an NGO and used
for emergency food supply in areas affected by the 2011 To-
hoku Earthquake and Tsunami (Miyazaki-Nichinichi Shim-
bun, 19 March 2011; Asahi Shimbun, 20 March 2011).
Our observation that physical impacts of tephra were
dominant over chemical impacts are consistent with obser-
vations following various large silicic eruptions, such as the
1980Mt. St. Helens (Cook et al., 1981), 1991 Hudson (Wil-
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son et al., 2011) and 2011 Puyehue Cordon-Caulle erup-
tions (Wilson et al., 2012a). In contrast, basaltic and an-
desitic tephras have lead to agricultural losses due to chemi-
cal effects, especially when there are high levels of available
ﬂuoride (Cronin et al., 2003). Notable examples include
various eruptions of Hekla and the 1995 Ruapehu eruption
(see Ayris and Delmelle, 2012). The lack of obvious serious
chemical impacts from the Shinmoedake andesitic tephra
highlights that the chemical hazard of tephras from indi-
vidual eruptions is highly variable (see Ayris and Delmelle,
2012), and strongly dependent on the crops exposed and en-
vironmental conditions.
Here, standard soil science techniques were used by agri-
cultural organisations to analyse the relevant properties of
the tephra and to screen for elevated elemental concentra-
tions. The results of these methodologies made for easy
comparison to well known soil equivalents by agricultural
ofﬁcials and farmers. However, these methods do not facil-
itate comparison to other tephras, as more specialist analy-
ses are typically used (Ayris and Delmelle, 2012). As the
Shinmoedake tephra was far coarser (0.5–10 mm) than typ-
ical soils particle sizes (<0.5 mm), and tephras are known
to potentially exhibit long-term, complex leaching of haz-
ardous elements (e.g. Fluoride), a specialist tephra analysis
protocol for agriculture may have been more useful to ade-
quately evaluate the hazard (Ayris and Delmelle, 2012).
The extreme concerns of long term impacts to farm pro-
ductivity at the time of the eruption were not realised, with
only one crop rotation affected and soils relatively easily
remediated through cultivation and supplementary fertilisa-
tion. Removal of tephra, deep cultivation and a focus on
maintaining physical fertility (e.g. CEC and water hold-
ing capacity) appears to have successfully mitigated any
medium to long-term effects of the tephra. Farmers were
largely able to absorb the impacts of the eruption, with some
government assistance, without having to alter their long-
term farming practices.
Agricultural agencies stressed the importance of rapid
identiﬁcation of the affected area, damage assessment, and
analysis of tephra characteristics. They also reported that
collation and dissemination of information was a signiﬁcant
challenge; it was time consuming to collate current tephra
chemical and textural characteristics with existing impact
and management data. In addition, some farmers were
not familiar with modern systems to receive information
quickly; elderly farmers often had limited access to the
internet.
Agricultural support and development organisations,
such as JA, were instrumental in providing practical advice,
informed by science. Whilst such organisations could col-
lect information from their networks regarding impacts ex-
perienced and recovery strategies implemented during pre-
vious eruptions in Japan, the collation usually took several
days. This was at a critical time when farmers required in-
formation quickly to reduce future losses. An aim for sci-
entists and agricultural organisations should therefore be to
collect, and present relevant data in an accessible way, so
that it may be accessed quickly in the case of future tephra
fall events. Information should be relevant to local agri-
cultural and climatic conditions, easily accessible and pre-
sented in the language best understood by agency workers
and farmers.
7.3 Electric power systems
A review of the main impacts from tephra fall on electric
power systems highlights: (1) supply outages from insulator
ﬂashover (unintentional electrical discharge around or over
the surface of an insulator, which creates a fault on the cir-
cuit), (2) disruption of generation facilities, (3) controlled
outages during tephra cleaning, (4) abrasion and corrosion
of exposed equipment, and (5) line (conductor) breakage
due to tephra loading (Wardman et al., 2012c). Of these
impacts, insulator ﬂashover is the most common. Electri-
cal networks experienced relatively few disruptions during
the Shinmoedake eruption. This was somewhat surprising
given the thickness of the tephra fall, comparable conduc-
tivity to past ﬂashover inducing tephras, and the extensive
electrical network exposed. Wardman et al. (2012c) has
suggested that 3 mm (3.3 kg/m2 in the case of Shinmoedake
tephra) is a lower threshold for insulator ﬂashover following
volcanic ash contamination for HV power systems. How-
ever, no ﬂashover activity occurred on any of the KEPC HV
network, despite over 10 km of line receiving in excess of
10 kg/m2 of tephra and over 17 km of line receiving in ex-
cess of 5 kg/m2 (Table 5). Resilient design of jacketed insu-
lators and over-insulation due to anthropogenic and coastal
salt pollution in the area, along with a responsive tephra
cleaning program for substations most likely contributed to
mitigating tephra contamination and subsequent disruption.
Additionally, the relatively coarse andesitic tephra appeared
to have lower adherence potential to electrical components;
the relatively dry conditions after the main tephra falls fur-
ther contributed to the high tolerance of the network.
KEPC communicated that a key success was the develop-
ment of an equipment cleaning system, so that when tephra
contamination problems arose (e.g. leakage current) a rapid
response could be made. KEPC had an up to date inventory
of personnel and equipment, so were able to quickly request
resources from other areas. The company identiﬁed that an
analysis of tephra resistivity was important to guide clean-
ing and other mitigation actions and also highlighted the
importance of maintaining a focus on the health and safety
of staff.
7.4 Rail network
Very few published examples exist where tephra falls
have caused the cancellation or disruption of train services.
Those that do were summarised by Blong (1984) as follows:
tephra of unknown thickness blocked rail lines for a period
of seven days during the 1906 eruption of Vesuvio; during
the May 1902 eruption of Soufrie`re, St. Vincent, a train was
derailed in Bridgetown, Barbados as the result of only 5
mm of tephra; rail services in western Montana were dis-
rupted by only 1–2 mm of tephra during the 1980 eruption
of St. Helens due to reduced visibility and concerns regard-
ing crew respiratory health; and from the same eruption,
in Ritzville where tephra was up to 40 mm thick, cancel-
lations and speed restrictions meant that full operation did
not resume for 11 days; similar problems were observed in
Missoula and Spokane.
In contrast to the above events, reduced visibility was
not of large concern to train operations during the erup-
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tion of Shinmoedake. It was determined that is was safe
for services to be operated in times of low visibility; al-
though, since services were cancelled at any sign of tephra
on tracks, few services operated during these conditions.
The network was however affected by mechanical failure
of track switches due to a build-up of tephra. The more
modern train network also suffered due to losses of electri-
cal contact between train wheels and track. JR Kyushu had
previous experience in dealing with tephra falls from Saku-
rajima volcano and therefore had established management
strategies that coped well during this crisis.
Although we focused here on impacts to the rail network,
road and air transport networks were also affected. Several
major roads were closed for periods of time due to reduced
visibility, but a rapid and well coordinated cleanup opera-
tion mitigated the impacts. The eruption also caused disrup-
tion to the aviation sector, particularly for Miyazaki airport,
which experienced a 22% reduction in passenger numbers
following several closures and, possibly, safety concerns of
tourists.
8. Conclusions
Two visits were made to the areas affected by tephra from
the 2011 Shinmoedake eruption with the aim to assess the
impacts of tephra fall on both a major urban area and agri-
cultural land, while focusing on four key sectors. Valuable
lessons from this event will add to the growing body of
evidence detailing impacts from diverse eruptions and will
help to inform the future management of tephra fall events
both in Japan and internationally.
The cleanup of tephra was time consuming, physically
demanding and costly and involved most residents and busi-
nesses. Limited data was available for calculating the costs
of cleanup; however, when considering the collection of
tephra from urban areas, we estimate a cost of 23 JPY (0.30
USD) per kg to the local government. Road cleanup op-
erations were estimated to cost approximately 50,300 JPY
(650 USD) per km or 17 JPY (0.22 USD) per kg.
Large initial impacts were felt by the agricultural sec-
tor with smothering, loading and abrasion of crops, soils
and greenhouses. However, extreme concerns at the time of
the eruption were not realised and long-term farming oper-
ations were not substantially affected. There were few dis-
ruptions to electrical networks due to resilient insulator de-
sign, a successful cleaning program, relatively coarse tephra
and dry conditions. Cancellations and delays occurred on
three rail lines resulting primarily from mechanical failure
of track switches and loss of electrical contact between train
wheels and tracks.
Generally, residents and organisations exhibited high lev-
els of adaptive capacity in response to the event. Regional
and national networks were critical in obtaining informa-
tion on past events and associated management and recov-
ery strategies. The relatively short eruption duration con-
tributed to a fast recovery, which was also aided by well re-
sourced and coordinated organisations and resilient infras-
tructure networks.
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